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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  May 1, 2011 3:00am-4:00am EDT

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the course of the relationship of a romantic notion of slave owners being good. james buchanan brings that into the presidency in 1856 and nothing in the southern states passivity and abraham lincoln is left with a huge mess in 1861. america has to go through civil war. >> are some of the story's going to make their way into the pages of hustler? >> guest: we are doing an excerpt. the key thing i am happy to do, the reception is great. a strong indicator as well. >> host: you are on your way to a panel. thank you for being with us. we are going to be doing a live panel and it is on american
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history. coming up next, american history blood and back rooms and it is moderated by diane smith. thomas powers on "the killing of crazy horse" and jim newton who wrote "justice for all: earl warren and the nation he made". that is right beside us on the campus of u.s. c. thanks for being with us. >> we appreciate you. in short the panel and i was reading this countdown. 10-9-8-7-6 -- >> thank you for coming on this beautiful day to talk about american history. so great to see so many people interested. i get a heads of that i am not being heard in the back. i know and don't have a loud voice. is that better? a little closer?
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how is that? i am not used to this. i am from montana. any excuse you can find. we know that we are not supposed to have our cellphone on. we would appreciate it if you would turn that off. no person or recordings allow. appreciate if you would follow that. how you like to organize this today. there are two panelists tonight. that gives you more time, if you have questions for the new panelists we do have microphones here so if you have questions that is where we need to have the questions asked. i would appreciate it if they were asked in the form of
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questions. twinkie comments or theories or whatever will just drag the session at and we won't answer everyone's question. 20 minutes for each. with these two incredible writers. susan, she had an emergency at the last minute and was unable to attend but are want to put a plug in for her book. how roosevelt have spurge, if you are interested in fdr and politics, i highly recommend the book. i am sure you can get it at the local bookstore. i want to start with jim newton.
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this amazing justice for all, history of earl warren and the nation he made. jim newton is a pulitzer prize-winning journalist. he is a senior fellow of ucla public affairs. he has a new biography coming out with dwight eisenhower and his white house years. we can segue into that history and you may know his name. it was done in the new yorker about the discovery -- from eisenhower in the new yorker. a really fascinating article that came out recently.
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with that i would like to turn it over to jim and have him tell us how we got into writing about earl warren. >> a cue for being here. before i say anything, it was a finalist for the book prize in history last night. what she should also tell you, the winner of the los angeles times. [applause] >> earl warren. i started poking around in 2001. i became an editor at the time and was responsible for california government and political coverage. i was initially drawn to his curiosity about his time as governor. you know earl warren until quite recently, to the history of
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california. it was a remarkable achievement--the first race he won, and incumbent democrat in the middle of the war. a very popular president in 1950, a third of those elections, not only beat us on -- and jimmy roosevelt, over a million votes. in the middle, the most interesting of all people in those days they practice cross filing which meant if you could run for any party's nomination warren is a republican, in the democratic party's -- the only governor to win both parties
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nominations. my initial discovery of the fascination of tournament--an extraordinary california politician and seven times for public office is never lost. in trying to figure him out in a larger sense what i was drawn to was the sense of paradox about it. earl warren in 1942, enthusiastic and unapologetic, 12 years later he was the principal offer of brown vs. board of education. within that is a whole story and a whole story of his development as a person and a political figure. and and keep tiffany, and rationalize the two together, all of that is true and we can talk about it as the event goes
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on but it is not the only example of questions that are raised by warren's record. the very first case he prosecuted early in his life, first case he won a conviction in was a leftist convicted under something that made it illegal to advocate force for violence against the government or another institution. one of the final cases he handed down as chief justice was a ruling that invalidated the law of the state's. this is really a fascinating paradox or contradiction or call it which you will. that motivated me into warren. as i mentioned, not only am i finishing--literally this morning i put in the fedex back and said to my editors of finishing it as we speak. the eisenhower book grew almost
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directly out of the warren book. warren i had thought about and interested as governor and that part of his life. the eisenhower book came to me differently. the editor in new york who believed there was potential for eisenhower presidency read warren bookend came with the idea of working on a race. unlike warren why felt i knew from close toice. unlike warren why felt i knew from close to the beginning of my research -- by the end of their lives they had little use for one another. very quickly the two were a part and there is a series of domestic security cases that the war on court handed down that really set up eisenhower and also had some differences about how the court went about desegregating schools and other institutions. i came to eisenhower believing i would end up a real critical of
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him. i learned something along the way, one of the beauties of this work is you really do want faint. i can only see eisenhower through the prison of civil-rights and domestic affairs. the work ahead doesn't shed no light on eisenhower for military, diplomatic or foreign affairs. through that prison his stature grows mentally and i read the eisenhower book, truly remarkable american president. if only for one fin, he deserves serious favorable treatment by history, eisenhower is the first american president to have the atomic bomb and it wasn't just a matter -- a period where the united states was the sole possessor of atomic weapons and didn't use it despite the advice and urging of the joint chiefs and cabinet and other senior
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advisers in korea and china and taiwan and the suez crisis, very powerful places in this administration. i ventured to say there are very few political figures in that period who could have held off that degree of urging and pleading with that amount of time. i get a lot of thoughts on the question, ran for president in 52 and i see him for the republican nomination. we are lucky and a country that eisenhower beat warren for that job and appointed him. i don't know that war and held off the joint chiefs the way i did. the joint chiefs came from rising through the ranks and knew them from west point on and was able to save them. so i do think they go together
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through my experience and the country is quite likely that he had a job the had. >> you use the term warren is an to describe his politics. i am reading it from today's prospective. i wonder if you could talk about the development of his politics and progressive republican moves to the right initially to gain elections but then makes another switch and by the end of the book i wasn't sure how you would describe his politics other than the term you used midway. >> one reason a eisenhower is disappointed in warren is misunderstood his politics. on the surface they appeared to
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be politically quite similar. robert taft is their opponent. from the right and the left. there are other things -- eisenhower saw him as a like-minded figure. what he didn't see is he grew up in the california progressive division. eisenhower was a columbia university -- after the war very much interest in big business and sort of traditional east coast republican party. it is a much different tradition and one that didn't really have a kind of national architect. it wasn't so much that warned changed in years to chief justice is eisenhower misapprehended his politics at the outset. as warren's own political development, scott polk who is the best scholar, we had a
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dinner leon and he pointed out that warren is a rare person who got better in every job he did. that is true. warren started his public life and was concerned with one issue, law enforcement in one area, then he ran for attorney general and as attorney general didn't broaden his range of issues so much as broad a beaten put upon which he practiced and egos to become governor and forced to deal with social issues that go far beyond law-enforcement and finally the chief justice where he has a national template and infinite range of issues. as he passed through each of those stages he became a bigger, fuller -- >> the first president to have
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nuclear-weapons and not use them. talk about the occasions on which he was pressed to use them and what pressure was actually used? who actually came to them, was a golf floated through back panels? but how he made that decision and how he let them know what was going to happen. >> there are several occasions. he inherited the presidency. from douglas macarthur to senior members of the military, there was a perfect desire when they could end those deaths and macarthur wrote a shocking memo to warren to eisenhower during the period after eisenhower was inaugurated suggesting his plan and fired by truman and you
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begin to see why. the plan to end war was to invite the soviets and chinese to in negotiation session to withdraw influence from europe and asia. should they refuse? of course they would. using nuclear weapons destroyed every chinese air field within flying distance of korea and a radioactive way so that -- it is impossible to imagine the world today had eisenhower followed that advice. as far as i can tell it is the last time there was a significant communication. as the presidency went on there are multiple occasions usually by the joint chiefs and national security council in which the use of nuclear weapons is discussed and usually saved for the joint chiefs but also members of the national security
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council as well. other occasions the french garrison, failing in indochina, strong pressure on weapons as necessary, when the chinese advanced on taiwan by attacking two remote islands off of the main island of taiwan and the joint chiefs looked before him of plan that should the chinese put soldiers on or even imminently threatened the island that they would use nuclear weapons during a meet suez crisis. the idea of using nuclear weapons, this occurred over and over. in the latter half of the latter years of the administration the administration became increasingly clear about whether the soviets were approaching
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terror in nuclear-weapons but that was a lot of conversation in early years. >> maybe you would like to talk a little bit about the article that was an amazing discovery of the way you described it. >> it is a reminder, historical research, happened to be at the eisenhower library that are lost in the early years. they are out on the loading deck, it turned out the personal papers of malcolm moose which was one of eisenhower's speechriders who unbeknownst to anyone left the administration with six boxes of farewell addresses in the military industrial speech.
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he had taken them home and stored them in a barn for several years and moved into a boat house in minnesota. corley because his son and daughter were at the boat house and wanted to get rid of the bosses. had over 20 correspondence relating to the speech and all kinds of details related to eisenhower's participation to personally edited drafts, so the great -- they shed a whole new light and much more sort of awful light on the draft of his speech. that was it was pointed out to me it all depended on the fact that they had a boat house and a cabin in minnesota. they would be done. they believe these documents froze every year. his wife killed, mold and allowed them to survive.
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a lovely coincidence that both heartening as a biographer and terrifying to know the day of the book comes out -- in the meantime it was terribly exciting. >> wasn't there talk as i recall that he hadn't actually drafted that piece? part of what he discovered? >> was this the work of speechwriters or reflected the personal message he wanted to get and makes people wonder because it seemed out of character to have this general deliver this denunciation of influence of military and military industrial complex. what this shows conclusively is that eisenhower was involved intimately in drafting the speech from the get go and over the course of many drafts interestingly almost everything change in the speech except for the passages deal with the military industrial complex that rivera at the beginning.
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>> i want to highly recommend jim's book on earl warren. we got distracted with eisenhower. if you want, incredible history of california that really is reflected in his life and as he moves into the supreme court, that history is again reflected in his life and the history of the nation i highly recommend "justice for all: earl warren and the nation he made". we have a chance to answer questions once we're through the rest of the panel. first want to introduce thomas powers. i have a book to show you. he is the author of the award winning "the killing of crazy horse". we already know that he won last night. i am proud to announce it was an
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incredible -- [applause] -- he is also the author of a book about richard helms. i have a nice twist here that i will just tell you about. he has written the intelligence wars, the confirmation, heisenberg's war, thinking about the next war, the man who kept the secrets and the war at home. it would seem unlikely that a man with such deep knowledge of the intelligence system in this -- unbelievable analysis and book reviews of the new york review of books, the subject of "the killing of crazy horse" is where i want to start today. how you were able to tackle a story that may not have a straight narrative. >> thank you for the kind words.
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those are always very long stories and i won't start and the absolute beginning but i will tell you that one of the reasons i was attracted to crazy horse was it didn't have any nuclear weapons in it. i was ready to move in a new direction and deal with new materials and i stumbled across it at the custer battlefield along the little bighorn river in 1994. first, started thinking as an adult about crazy horse. if any of you have been there and stood on custer hill you may have experienced what i did. you looked to the south and you see this string of white crosses coming across in your direction. you are almost on the top. almost at a place where a person might be able to determine the
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military underneath the attack. and sometimes in dozens or scores. it comes very real. looking over the countryside you see roughly what custer would have seen or the indians attacking him would have seen. the biggest change is a railroad line and a lawn that railroad line, several times a day a gigantic train leaves from montana heading towards south carolina or west virginia to create electricity. when there is no train on the rise and everything looks the way it looked at an earlier time. if you look down and the winding river you are likely to see a lot of horses that belonged to the pro scouts who came to that
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site with custer and that actually inherited the battlefield. it is very immediate and at that point i started thinking about it. writing a book about the killing of crazy horse required a lot of basic literary decisions of a sort that i had never confronted before personally in my life. the big one was what kind of a book was that i was trying to write? i finally saw the distinction as one between telling a story or describing, explaining and judging. a lot of history in fall describing, explaining and judging of large and complicated things but the things that drew me to history originally and to writing in general was the
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compelling nature of stories which would take hold of you. you couldn't let them go. i decided that was one wanted to do. the incredible task of interesting characters here many of whom were visible and there were dramatic events taking place. the killing of crazy horse which took place in 1877 in some ways was a minor event but on the other hand it was devastating in its psychological effects on the indians and other indians as well and that is still the case. most americans get through years at a time without thinking of the killing of crazy horse but that is not true. they resent it and they are still -- there are still factions in the tribe that are
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glad of it. they did what they could to ensure that crazy horse would not survive that day so there's a lot of natural drama. i wanted to tell that and a narrative and withhold describing, explaining and judge in the abstract tools that a historian brings at hand and in order to do that i had to make a decision that went deeply against my own nature. i love to explain complicated fans. i find it irresistible to say what things mean or where the real explanation lies or why it happens this way rather than another way of. i had to decide to not do that and let it tell -- put the elements on the page that would
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allow the story to emerge. i don't know how successful that worked but that was what i tried to do. for those of you who are interested in writing history or narrative in general about the real world i would suggest at some early stage, some ancient authors who invented this way thinking about the world. i would particularly recommend you read about the peloponnesus in war and the jewish war and that you read plutarch, particularly the lives of caesar and alexander. starch with plutarch. it is possible you think you could never be engaged by the ancient life of caesar i promise that is not true. he had a long description of the way caesar would talk to his
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men. in order to prepare for battle and to get them in the proper mood of feeling powerful, one of the things he would do is pick up a stick and talk about the stick, the male member of and one is going to do to the enemy and as you read this you think oh my god! that is a guy who really has the capacity to get a lot of people to do a dangerous thing without thinking. it is very vivid. when you read these other fans, of the jewish war. probably a lot of people here are not sure which people i am talking about. this took place in the early years of what is now known as the christian era and it involved among others things the seed of the city of masada. i am sure a lot of people have
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heard about that. it is a marvelous place to visit. the jewish rebels secretive themselves in the city of masada and resisted a roman siege for many months. they built a wall around it and slowly began construction of a gigantic causeway from the nearest high plateau up to the city which was on abuse and it took a long time to do this but the romans were specialists at this sort of thing. it would bring thousands of people in and start filling up with her -- wicker baskets with the earth and gravel that go to the edge of the cliff and pour it in until they filled in this gigantic french and rebel because way of to the wall of the city and over a period of many months the people inside the city realized what was coming. the moment was about to arrive when they could not resist any further and they made a decision
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to kill themselves. this is described by someone who knew what happened because he went for a similar but survived, similar process himself. .lead >> story first.
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explanation later. now, the story of crazy horse has many dramatic elements in it, and i expressed interest in the battle of little big horn in the center of the killing of crazy horse because the thing he did that made the army want to kill him, and for those of you who forgot, 1876, middle of the great sioux war, general george armstrong customer prepared to attack an indian village on the banks of the river, and there was crazy horse. customer was a hero of the civil war, a man with a great reputation as a battlefield plunger and skilled military tactician, and he divided his forces, took five companies of calvary with him personally and started down the river to attack the sioux village, and before he
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started on his way, the crow scouts he had with him telling him where things were and helping him find his way around all said the village down there is the biggest village ever. there are too many indians, don't do it, and as you are reading about this and thinking about it, you're instinct is don't do it. listen to those guys. [laughter] wait for the rest of the troops to show up tomorrow which they were all hurrying to do, but custer was a strong headed man with confidence and that convinced him that he and the 7th calvary could whip any number of indians in any circumstances, and they did do it and exactly what happened after that has proven difficult to reconstruct over the many years since because the typical
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approach of historians has been to say there the story stops. we know nothing, custer led his men to the river, and no one came back to describe what happened. well, several thousand indians survived, and many of them left quite extensive accounts of what happened, and at the point he starts down that river, you just change your focus and start to listen to the indians. you're in a position to find out what actually did happen, and the battle that ensued i would say was decided as a certain moment actually by crazy horse, and the military when they analyzed it later decided pretty much the same thing. from that moment forward when they realized what he had done, they considered crazy horse to be a dangerous man, and that danger that he posed plus the general anger at crazy horse for
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killing a famous american general was what led to his killing in the september of 1877, about a year later, so that serves an as introduction to what it was i did and tried to do, and now you can grill. >> grill you. [laughter] >> well, i have to say that description is so vivid and cinematic because we see it from the other perspective that i saw that battlefield entirely different after reading that section of the book. >> thank you. [laughter] >> i guess there's no comment needed. the other thing i wanted to read a little tiny quote a friend wrote to me when i was reading your book. he said that the killing itself was an event so complex with so many motives and nuances, that it is still a puzzle.
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he obviously had not read your book. i was reading and going, oh, in, i think i have the pieces here. i think you gave it to me, but i was curious how you approached all those millions of different sources which can be a little complex in their own right in trying to bring that in that multifaceted approach to the story. >> it's very complicated to hold a bunch of desperate accounts in your head at one time. the older you get, the more complicated it gets. [laughter] i'll tell you who taught me to do that, and it was a man named james jesus angleton, head of the cia up until 1975, and i went to see him once when i was writing some cia history, and he was talking about the dangers posed by a congress publishing
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inging accounts of various cia operations and why it shouldn't be done. i said i don't get it? it's ancient history. the other side know what happens, what's the problem with investigating this because it's a serious matter, and the public deserves to know. he said, well, if you do that, you allow them, meaning the russian in this case, you allow them to build a very deep crono. i said what's a crono? he said it's a chronology. it's simple, but requires a discipline. the simple part is you put in a list everything you know about a certain subject by date and by time if you happen to know enough so there's a lot of things that happened on the same date, and you don't judge them. let's say you have other
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information that suggests it couldn't have happened on that but another day, no, you just put it in the chrono how it's found in the original source, and when you do that, build a deep chrono about something, you can build very secret things, and the pattern becomes quite evident and begins to emerge. it's very hard, very, very difficult to hide a big event no matter how much you hide it in secrecy, the chrono tells the story almost every time. basically, that's what i did. i took the various sources, and i built chronologies, careful cro enologies of each event, and if there were three or four people in there talking about it, i put them in there. if they contradicted each other, i exercised that discipline, never judge myself and so and so says this, but it can't be because somebody else said that. you have to look at the whole
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thing with the contradictions, and gradually it emerges and you see what happened. >> there was a show in new york recently of picasso's guitars, and reading your book reminded me of the "new york times'" photographs in which you're looking at an object or an event, but from so many different perspectives, and i think you did something comparable with time and space and also people and that's fascinating. how did you keep all these different characters and names and people in as part of that chronology? >> there comes a moment, a series of moments, connected moments, in the last hours of crazy horse's life where there is astonishing number of witnesses to the exact
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circumstances of his fatal wounding, and then his slow death over the period of four or five hours afterwards. the army was trying to put him under arrest to put him in ohm ha and eventually florida to go to a federal prison. as soon as he realized the army broke every single promise to him, and that moment came when he saw the window -- the bars in the windows, he made and effort to break free, one of the soldiers stabbed him in the back which pierced a kidney and seemed to have pierced a lung, and it was those two wounds that killed him. there's many people standing in the crowd outside the guard house, some friends, enemies, military people, civilians, doctors, a lot of witnesses. crazy horse's family are there.
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he's got a wife standing in the crowd, and all these people left varying accounts of what happened. when i came to a moment like somebody would say, crazy horse staggered. he fell back, and he rolled over on to the ground or crazy horse was stabbed, took two steps and fell forward, or crazy horse first rolled on to his back and then his front and there was blood in his mouth, no somewhere else, rather than make an arbitrary attempt to sort of say, well, which was it, you know? did he fall backwards or forwards or to fudge it by saying, well, he fell, or he fell to the ground. you could easily do that, and you might think i can't put in two different things because it's confusing to the reader, and if i put one in, they both can't be right.
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what do i choose? rather than do that, i put them all in. [laughter] briefly, and only about the things that where the exact detail was not as important as the feel of the dramatic tension. if anybody's been in a crowd that suddenly turns violent, you feel it everywhere. you feel it in your body from every direction and everybody in the whom crowd is tense, and that's what happened with crazy horse, and i wanted to capture that intensity and the rapidity of which events unfolded. >> interesting. jim, do you have questions for tom? also, i remind you if you have questions, if you want to start moving to the microphones, we'll acknowledge you guys next. >> two questions from the talk. first, did you think about doing a straight biography of crazy
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horse, and if not, how did you end up with this? second, i wondered thing thes by the indians, were they in english or translated or how did you get access to them? >> the accounts are in english now. they were typically given to lakota and translated at the scene by the lakota speaker, mixed bloods, growing up with lakota as the first language. >> recorded in a document? >> transcribed at that time, and sometimes a little lakota is included or you can read the lakota back and reconstruct the lakota, but typically not. typically, it's an english document. what was the other question? >> i wondered if you considered a more traditional approach -- >> a biography. actually, no, i didn't. i wanted to know why they killed him. it was obvious when you looked at it, it was completely unnecessary, and all the people
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involved knew that. they all went home depressed that night and felt something wrong and unnecessary had happened. i wanted to know why that happened, and then as time went by, the question in my mind shifted somewhat to why did crazy horse let them do it? he did. he let them do it up until that last final moment, so i -- i was interested in the event, and there's a lot of lies to the surrounding of the event, not just his, and i tried to include as much as you needed to know how he grew up and early influences and all of that, but conventional biographies starting with the day of birth and -- i never considered that. yeah, somebody got a question out there? >> yeah, so we have questions for anything an warren, eisenhower, crazy horse. this gentleman here. >> i have a question actually
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for jim. i've read that when obama was first legislated, he was compared a lot to ronald reagan style and maybe strategy, but in two years into his presidency, i've read more often he's compared to eisenhower. do you have a comment on that? >> i hadn't heard it made much, but there's app reasons to make it. i think both had to govern in periods against another party. ike when elected in 52 was elected with a narrow republican majority, and two years later, lost that, and then governed with a democratic congress and i think you hear comparisons in recent weeks just over the trouble in the middle east. eisenhower confronted the suez crisis in 1956, and to the amazement sided with egypt and
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britain and france, and in a couple of those instances, there's parallels. obama is a whole other conversation than what we're having today, but this -- eisenhower offers a real template of governing from the middle. obama unlike the reasons that drew eisenhower to it is in that position today, and so i think there's real lessons to learn from eisenhower record in terms of what he can achieve with a very polarized political environment. >> mr. newton, i heard for a number of years that the complete phrase of the military industrial complex was preceded by a word congress, that congress, the military industrial complex. is that true? >> the phrase as usually reppedderred is military industrial congressional complex. >> oh. >> that phrase appears in none of the drafts of the speech, but
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the speech writers working on the speech, one of them said they considered it at one point, considered including it in the draft. it's hard to know from the document how seriously they considered it because it never made it into a draft. i will say this. the rest of the speech would have been at odds with the tone of the speech which some of the rest remember parts of the speech at the beginning. ice recaps his relationship with congress over the years beginning with the appointment to west point, continuing through the war, and then concluded obviously with his presidency. it is a friendly farewell to congress, and if he threw them into the complex, i think he would have upset the tone he was seeking to establish with congress as he left. that may be the reason that they considered it and discorded it right away. >> thank you. >> sure. >> go ahead. >> my question is also for
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mr. newton. in regards to earl warren with his decision in brown vs. board of education, a lot of the discussion i've heard is that it was much an apology for what he did to the jeep these and that -- japanese, and he wanted a strong voice to the court, and that's why he pushed and spent so much time arguing with the other justices to get a unanimous verdict on brown and that brown for him was as much part of his, you know, i screwed up with the japanese, so let's do things right with everybody. >> i don't think that's right. i'm certainly with you that many people frame it that way. it's tempting to see brown as a psychological expression. i don't think it was. first of all, warren was reluctant to admit error. he believed he advocated the best he could under a pressure
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environment and there is no national security consideration hanging over brown. that said, i think that he -- and by the way, he found an excruciatingly difficult to apologize for those reasons i suspect only in his memoirs did he finally say he regrets the role he played, and even then the draft he left at the time of his death said i forget the fact language, but i come to regret, and his editor put deeply regret. it's really hard, a very stubborn man. [laughter] i don't think it's right to think of brown as a sort of remedial action for the internment. that takes away nothing though from the work he did to achieve a unanimous court in brown. it's just impossible to imagine had fred lived, his predecessor of chief justice, there would have been a unanimous court.
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in fact, vineson indicated he would have upheld segregation, and tom clark from kentucky and texas also indicated they would uphold seg segregation and others like jackson who ideologically liberal, but advocates of judicial restraint would have voted to it. there's a possible chance they could have lost the cases. he delivered not only the majority, but the unanimous court. >> thank you. >> you're welcome. >> going back and forth, go ahead. >> mr. powers as a fellow writer of history, i was fascinated to hear you talk about your previous career use of judgment and how you suspended it in writing about crazy horse. i want to ask you and ms. smith and mr. newton, in what way do you grapple with your own perm world view and judgments when you write history, when did you suspend it, and what times do
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you decide upon a theme that sort of shapes how you judge the subject of your work? >> well, when i say i suspended judgment, i really ought to say that i was held judgment -- withheld judgment. when you work in a field of this kind, in the beginning you have to retain a certain openness and a nonquarrelsomeness. if you have ideas where the book is to go and what it means, you'll miss a lot. you have to do that in a human way. hold back. when something comes up that makes you uncomfortable, listen to that, you know? pursue that, stick with that, so i was forming judgments all the time, but i did not the text to be a text of judgment.
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i wanted it to be a text of narrative so the events are there, the people say things at a certain time, so you see certain things. something's lying on the ground bleeding and people fight over it whether or not to move him into the house, you have a reaction. well, when you write that, you write the emotional reaction, you write the feeling of oh, do something for the guy. you want the reader to feel that, but you don't say, what's the matter with these people? [laughter] it's in that sense that i withhold judgment, but it's not like i didn't have tons. >> jim, did you want to weigh in? >> i'd like to do it the way tom does it. [laughter] >> okay. moving on over here then. >> mr. powers and mr. newton, two questions. mr. powers, from what happened to the indian people, one can
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surmise with crazy horse why he let that happened. maybe i missed it. i wanted to know what you thought crazy horse -- in other words, why he let that happen that he be killed, and mr. knew don, i wanted to -- newton, i want to ask you about a criticism about his final speech and the atomic bomb information you've given here today withstanding, he did allow a certain build up of this military industrial complex, so if you would care to speak to that. >> well, i kind of hate to give it away. >> oh, okay. i understand. okay. [laughter] >> i'll say it simply. >> i understand, okay. >> he elected to trust what he was told, and how difficult that would have been under those circumstances is something you'll have to go to the trouble of reading the book to find out,
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but he elected to trust them until the moment when trust became impossible. >> to your other question, i would just say eisenhower never believed the united states should be in a position to be unilaterally disarming and believed it was in the national interest to develop an arsenal, not to use it, but essential to deterrent. i don't think he would have argued or i would that that was either the -- that that was in any way intended to bolster the military industrial complex, just bolster the military. the complex he saw was the relationship between the military and the domestic -- the arms industry, and what he was concerned about that as tom had gone on, because of the development of nuclear missiles and the shortness of time that that gave the united states to respond to an attack, that we no longer had the ability as a country to convert civilian
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industries into arms industries to fight a war. that created a new phenomena, a permanent arms industry conjoined to the immediate threat, and it's that -- that phenomena that he was worried about in terms of going forward what it meant in terms of the effect of this industry on policy. one of the things that appears to have motivated him in all of this, he was ver agitated by the -- very agitated by the ad if the aerospace magazines. you saw ads for a new bomber or f-16. he realized these are not ads meant for a general purchaser, only the united states government. that seems to get him frustrated on the oddity of this complex and the result of this speech. last point quickly, one of the first speeches of his presidency is the chance for peace speech
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talking e gauntly -- eloquently. the military complex and his fears about it were not late developments in his presidency. the overarching theme of the cost of bracing for a conflict was there from the first months of his presidency. >> so, and did he do any other things or just that this was -- this was on the forefront? he saw this coming and was trying to -- in his own way -- do what he could. >> he was warning of it as he left office, warning the american people this prop existed and would persist. >> thank you. >> five minutes, so i'll move here and try to move through to get the questions in. >> this question is for jim newton and, mr. newton, i believe you mentioned eisenhower disagreed with warren's handling of the brown vs. board of
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education, and i don't know if you want to take time for that now, but do you explore that in either of the books? >> in both in fact. very briefly, there's no evidence that he believed the court wrongly decided brown, but he did not choose to regard brown as a overdo delivery of constitutional rights to the plaintiff, but chose to see it as an order from the court and announced it a few days later that the court has spoken, and i will obey. the problem with that, and it's natural given his background as a military officer, that he tended to see things in that formulation. the problem with that in this case is it give hope to southerners in particular that he was sympathetic, and i think ultimately it took little rock for him to persuade the south he would not tolerate this and whatever his personal feelings about brown and the court were, and by that point he was quite agitated with the court, he was
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going to see to it that federal authority was federal authority, and therefore, it took little rock, i think, to persuade people he meant that seriously. >> sir, come over on this side next. >> yes, addressed to tom and jim, just to throw out your comments before concerning the comparison of obama and eisenhower with respect to their resonance with superpower active engagement of the enemy, ect., ect., the history of eisenhower speaks completely, completely different from obama in my humble opinion. if you go back to world war ii, he almost preempted roosevelt in saying no, we're not going to go to berlin. there's too many american lives lost, let the russians do it, and i don't think roosevelt had had come to that decision, and yet eisenhower wrote directly to marshall stalin concerning that subject where our troops shipped
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south towards south eastern mew nick hour and so on. >> sir, two minutes, get to the question. >> he had a relationship with marshall stalin, a relationship with general conon, he was very involved with the crisis, an i don't see how the obama background compares in any circumstance to that. >> i wasn't trying to say the backgrounds were comparable at all, and clearly couldn't be different. there are some moments that confront obama today in which eisenhower provides a valuable lesson. >> and sir, last question in right on the wire. >> mr. powers, do you care to give any clue as to why the


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